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Abstract—The area of networking games has had a growing
impact on wireless networks. This reflects the recognition in
the important scaling advantages that the service providers
can benefit from by increasing the autonomy of mobiles in
decision making. This may however result in inefficiencies that
are inherent to equilibria in non-cooperative games. Due to the
concern for efficiency, centralized protocols keep being considered
and compared to decentralized ones. From the point of view
of the network architecture, this implies the co-existence of
network-centric and terminal centric radio resource management
schemes. Instead of taking part within the debate among the
supporters of each solution, we propose in this paper hybrid
schemes where the wireless users are assisted in their decisions
by the network that broadcasts aggregated load information.
We derive the utilities related to the Quality of Service (QoS)
perceived by the users and develop a Bayesian framework to
obtain the equilibria. Numerical results illustrate the advantages
of using our hybrid game framework in an association problem
in a network composed of HSDPA and 3G LTE systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
In order to handle the growing wireless traffic demand,
operators are often faced with the need to install new base
stations. This could result in splitting cells into smaller ones,
or in having several base stations covering the same cell.
The second option may be preferred when the traffic has
high variability (in time and space) in which case it may be
advantageous to have the possibility to allocate resources from
both base stations to any point in the cell. This flexibility
comes at a cost of having to include an access control that
takes the proper association decisions for the mobiles, that of
deciding to which base station (BS) to connect. To achieve
efficient use of the resources, these decisions should be based
not only on the current system state but also on expected future
demand which may interact with traffic assigned in the present.
We wish to avoid completely decentralized solutions of the
association problem in which all decisions are taken by the
mobiles, due to well known inefficiency problems that may
arise when each mobile is allowed to optimize its own utility.
This inefficiency is inherent to the non-cooperative nature of
the decision making. On the other hand, we wish to delegate
to the mobiles a large part in the decision making in order to
alleviate the burden from the base stations.
The association schemes actually implemented are fully
centralized: the operator tries to maximize his utility (revenue)
by assigning the users to the different systems [1]-[3]. How-
ever, distributed RRM mechanisms are gaining in importance:
Users may be allowed to make autonomous decisions in a
distributed way. This has lead to game theoretic approaches to
the association problems in wireless networks, as can be found
in [4]-[8]. The potential inefficiency of such approaches have
been known for a long time. The term ”The Tragedy of the
Commons” has been frequently used for this inefficiency [9];
it describes a dilemma in which multiple individuals acting
independently in their own self-interest can ultimately destroy
a shared limited resource even when it is clear that it is not
in anyone’s long term interest for this to happen.
We propose in this paper association methods that combine
benefits from both decentralized and centralized design. Cen-
tral intervention is needed during severe congestion periods.
At those instants, we assume that the mobiles follow the
instructions of the base stations. Otherwise the association
decision is left to the mobiles, who make the decision based
on aggregated state information from the base stations. The
decision making is thus based on partial information that is
signaled to the mobiles by the base station. A central design
aspect is then for the base stations to decide how to aggregate
information which then determines what to signal to the users.
Note that this decision making at the BS can be viewed as a
mechanism design problem, or as a Bayesian game.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. System description
We consider a network composed of S systems operated by
the same operator. Even if the model we develop is applicable
to different kinds of situations, we will focus on the more
realistic and cost effective case where the operator uses the
same cell sites to deploy the new system (e.g. 3G LTE), while
keeping the old ones (e.g. HSDPA). As, in each cell, there are
different radio conditions following the position of the user
regarding the cell site, the peak throughput that can be obtained
by the user connected to system s, if served alone by a cell,
differs following his position in the cell, as illustrated in Figure
1 for a cell served by HSDPA and 3G LTE. For simplicity, we
consider that there are N classes of radio conditions and that
users with radio condition n have a peak rate Dsn if connected
to system s. The network state is then defined by the vector:
M = (M11 , ...,M
1
N , ...,M
S
1 , ...,M
S
N), M
s
n being the number
of users with radio condition n connected to system s.
Fig. 1. LTE and HSDPA peak throughputs for different user positions.
We assume that the network broadcasts a partial load
information l (1 ≤ l ≤ L), e.g., an aggregated load information
indicating for each system if it is in low, medium, or high
load state. An example of this load information is described in
Figure 2 for a network composed of HSDPA and LTE systems.
Fig. 2. Aggregated load information.
B. Policy definition
As stated before, users are only aware of the load informa-
tion l sent by the network. Their policies are then based on this
information. Let P be a policy defined by the actions taken by
mobiles in the different load conditions. P is a N ×L matrix
whose element Pnl is equal to s if class-n users connect to
system s when the network broadcasts information l.
Let A be the space of feasible states, P be the set of all
possible policies and let L be the set of load information.
An assignment f : A → L specifies for each network state
M the corresponding load information f(M). On the other
hand, when the load information is equal to l and the policy
is P, we can determine the system to which users of class n
will connect by the value Pnl. As an example, knowing the
function f(.) and the policy P, if the network is in state M,
a class n user will connect to system Pnl, where l = f(M).
There are some important remarks to keep in mind when
speaking about policies. The first is that we suppose that a
user connected to a system stays within it until the end of
his communication in order to avoid vertical handovers and
their signaling overhead. Furthermore, even if the decision
is distributed, all users will have the same policy and learn
together how to enhance it. However, a policy change will
occur after an observation time, long enough to insure that
the steady state of the network has been reached. Note also
that users can connect to a system only if there is room in
it, otherwise they are directed by the network to an available
system or blocked if all systems are saturated.
III. UTILITIES
We analyze a system offering streaming calls. The goal of
a streaming user is to achieve the best throughput, knowing
that the different codecs allow a throughput between an upper
(best) Tmax and a lower (minimal) Tmin bounds. His utility is
thus expressed by the quality of the streaming flow he receives,
which is in turn closely related to his throughput. Indeed,
a streaming call with a higher throughput will use a better
codec offering a better video quality. This throughput depends
not only on the peak throughput, but also on the evolution of
the number of calls in the system where the user decides to
connect. Note that a user that cannot be offered this minimal
throughput in neither of the available systems is blocked in
order to preserve the overall network performance.
A. Steady state analysis
1) Instantaneous throughput: The instantaneous throughput
obtained by a user in a system depends on the state of the
system. The throughput of a user with radio condition class n
connected to system s is given by:
tsn(M) = min
[
Dsn
G(M)∑N
m=1
∑S
r=1M
r
m
, Tmax
]
(1)
where G(M) is the scheduler gain. Note here that the admis-
sion control will insure that tsn(M) ≥ Tmin by blocking new
arrivals. The space of feasible states A is thus the set of all
states M where this constraint is ensured:∑N
m=1
∑S
r=1M
r
m
G(M)
≤
Tmin
Dsn
, ∀n, s|M sn > 0 (2)
2) Steady state probabilities: The throughput achieved by
a user depends on the number of ongoing calls. This latter is
a random variable whose evolution is governed by the arrival
and departure processes. We assume that the arrival process of
new connections with radio condition n is Poisson with rate
λn. Each arriving user makes a streaming connection whose
duration is exponentially distributed with parameter 1/µ.
Within the space of feasible states A, transitions are due to:
• Arrivals of users of radio condition n. Let
Gsn(M) denote the state of the system if we
add one mobile of radio conditions n to system
s: GHn (M) = (M
1
1 , ...,M
1
N , ...,M
s
1 , ...,M
s
n +
1, ...,M sN , ...,M
S
1 , ...,M
S
N ). The transition from state M
to Gsn(M) happens if the policy implies that system s is
to be chosen for the load information corresponding to
state M, and if the state Gsn(M) is an admissible state.
The corresponding transition rate is thus equal to:
q(M,Gsn(M)|P) = λn · IPn,f(M)=s · IGsn(M)∈A (3)
where IC is the indicator function equal to 1 if condition
C is satisfied and to 0 otherwise.
• Departures of users of radio condition n. Let Dsn(M)
denote the state with one less mobile of class (n, s). The
transition from state M to Dsn(M) is equal to:
q(M,Dsn(M)|P) = M
s
n · µ · IMsn>0 (4)
The transition matrix Q(P) of the Markov process is written
for each policy P knowing that its diagonal element is:
q(M,M|P) = −
N∑
n=1
S∑
s=1
(q(M,Dsn(M)|P)+q(M,G
s
n(M)|P))
(5)
The steady-state distribution is then obtained by solving:{
Π(P) ·Q(P) = 0
Π(P) · e = 1;
(6)
Π(P) being the vector of the steady-state probabilities
pi(M|P) under policy P and e is a vector of ones.
Once the vector Π is obtained, the global performance
indicators can be calculated, e.g., the blocking rate of class-n
calls knowing that the load information is equal to l:
bn(l|P) =
∑
M∈A;Gsn(M)/∈A,∀s∈[1,S]
pi(M|P)∑
M∈A;f(M)=l pi(M|P)
(7)
In this equation, we consider as blocked all calls that arrive in
states where both systems are saturated, i.e., where tsn(M) <
Tmin, ∀j ∈ H,L. We also obtain the overall blocking rate:
b(P) =
N∑
n=1
λn∑N
m=1 λm
∑
M∈A;Gsn(M)/∈A,∀s∈[1,S]
pi(M|P) (8)
B. Transient analysis
The steady-state analysis described above is not sufficient
to describe the utility of the users as the throughput obtained
by a user at his arrival is not a sufficient indication about
the quality of his communication because of the dynamics of
arrivals/departures. In order to obtain the utility, we modify the
Markov chain in order to allow tracking mobiles during their
connection time. For users of radio condition n connected to
system s, only states where there is at least one user (n, s)
are considered. The calculation is as follows:
1) Introduce absorbing states Asn corresponding to the
departure of mobiles that have terminated their connec-
tions. Additional transitions are thus added between M
and Asn with rate equal to:
q˜sn(M, A
s
n) = µ · IMsn>0 (9)
The transitions to the neighboring states with one less
user are then modified accordingly by subtracting µ from
the original transition rates defined in equation (4):
q˜sn(M,D
s
n(M)|P) = (M
s
n − 1) · µ · IMsn>0 (10)
The remaining transition rates remain equal to the orig-
inal transitions:
q˜sn(M,G
s′
n′(M)|P) = q(M,G
s′
n′(M)|P), ∀n
′, s′
and
q˜sn(M,D
s′
n′(M)|P) = q(M,D
s′
n′(M)|P), ∀n
′, s′ 6= s
2) Define matrix Q˜sn of elements q˜sn(M,M′) defined above
and with diagonal elements as in equation (5):
q˜sn(M,M|P) = q(M,M|P)
Under policy P , the volume of information Isn(M|P)
sent by system s users subject to radio conditions n
starting from state M is then equal to the volume of
information sent between state M and the absorbing
state Asn. These values can be calculated by solving the
set of linear equations for all states M:∑
q˜sn(M,M
′|P)Isn(M
′|P) = −tsn(M) (11)
knowing that Isn(Asn) = 0.
3) The utility of a class-n user that has found the network
in state M and chosen to connect to system s is the
volume of information sent starting from state Gsn(M).
Recall that Gsn(M) is defined as the state with one more
class-n call connected to system s:
usn(M|P) = I
s
n(G
s
n(M)|P) (12)
IV. OPTIMALITY, GAME AND CONTROL
In this section, we use the utilities of users that we obtained
above to derive the association policies. We first search for the
optimal policy, i.e. the policy that maximizes the global utility
of the network. Nevertheless, as it is not realistic to consider
that the users will seek the global optimum, we show how
to find the policy that corresponds to the Nash equilibrium,
knowing that users will try to maximize their individual utility.
We will next show how the operator can control, by sending
appropriate load information, the equilibrium of its wireless
users to maximize its own utility.
A. Optimality
1) Global utility: When a global optimum is sought, it is
important to maximize the QoS of all users. The global utility
function can be written as:
U(P) =
N∑
n=1
λn∑N
i=1 λi
∑
l∈L
[(1− bn(l|P))× (13)
∑
M|f(M)=l
u
(Pn,l)
n (M|P)pi(M|P)]
knowing that Pn,l ∈ [1, S] is the system where new users of
class-n connect when they receive the load information l and
have the policy P.
Note that, in this utility, we consider not only the QoS of
accepted users (throughput), but also the blocking rate as the
aim is also to maximize the number of accepted users. We
also weight the users with different radio conditions with their
relative arrival rates.
2) Optimal policy: Knowing the utility in equation (13),
the optimal policy is the one among all possible policies that
maximizes this utility:
P∗ = argmax
P
U(P) (14)
B. Equilibrium
1) Individual utility: If the aim is to maximize the individ-
ual utility, users of different radio conditions are interested by
maximizing the QoS they obtain given the load information
broadcast by the network. The utility that a class n user might
obtain if he chooses system s when the load information is l,
while all other users follow policy P is then:
Usnl(P) =
∑
M|f(M)=l u
s
n(M|P)pi(M|P)∑
M|f(M)=l pi(M|P)
(15)
2) Nash equilibrium: A policy P∗ corresponds to a Nash
equilibrium if, for all radio conditions and all load information,
the individual utility obtained when following P∗ is the
largest possible utility under P∗. Mathematically, this can be
expressed by the following inequality for all radio conditions
n ∈ [1, N ] and all load information l ∈ [1, L]:
U
(P∗n,l)
nl (P
∗) ≥ Usnl(P
∗), ∀s ∈ [1, S] (16)
C. Control
In the previous section, we derived the policy that corre-
sponds to the Nash equilibrium for a game where players
are the wireless users that aim at maximizing their utility.
However, there is another dimension of the problem related
to the information sent by the network and corresponding to
the different load information. Motivated by the fact that the
network may guide users to an equilibrium that optimizes its
own utility if he chooses the adequate information to send,
we introduce a control problem, that can also be modeled as
a game between the base station and its users. At the core
lies the idea that introducing a certain degree of hierarchy
in non-cooperative games not only improves the individual
efficiency of all the users but can also be a way of reaching a
desired trade-off between the global network performance at
the equilibrium and the requested amount of signaling.
More formally, the way of aggregating the loads in the
broadcast information (expressed by the function f(.)) is
inherent to the previous analysis. In particular, the utilities
of individual users, calculated in equation (15), is function of
f(.):
Usnl(P|f) =
∑
M|f(M)=l u
s
n(M|P)pi(M|P)∑
M|f(M)=l pi(M|P)
This leads the wireless users to a Nash equilibrium that de-
pends on the way the network aggregates the load information:
P∗ = P∗(f)
The control problem is thus defined as the maximization of
the utility of the network by tuning the function f(.). If the
aim of the operator is to maximize its revenues by maximizing
the acceptance ratio, the optimal solution is:
f∗ = argmax
f
1
b(P∗(f))
(17)
with blocking defined as in equation (8).
V. RESULTS
For illustration, we consider the case of a network composed
of HSDPA and 3G LTE systems. Users are classified between
users with good radio conditions (or cell center users) and
users with bad radio conditions (or cell edge users). The
network sends aggregated load information as shown in Figure
2 with the following thresholds: [H1 = 0.3, H2 = 0.7, L1 =
0.3, L2 = 0.7], meaning that a system is considered as highly
loaded if its load exceeds 0.7 and as low-loaded if its load is
below 0.3.
We also consider a streaming service where users require a
minimal throughput of 1 Mbps and can profit from throughputs
up to 2 Mbps in order to enhance video quality (Dmin =
1Mbps and Dmax = 2Mbps). We consider an offered traffic
that varies from 1 to 10 Erlangs and obtain numerically the
equilibrium points.
A. Equilibrium
We focus on the Nash equilibrium when wireless users
aim at maximizing their individual utility. For comparison
purposes, we study three different association approaches:
• Hybrid decision approach: The proposed hybrid scheme
where users receive aggregated load information and
aim at maximizing their individual utility. We illustrate
the global utility corresponding to the Nash equilibrium
policy.
• Peak rate maximization approach: This is a simple asso-
ciation scheme where users do not have any information
about the load of the systems. They connect to the system
offering them the best peak rate:
s∗ = argmax
s
Dsn
Note that this peak rate can be known by measuring the
quality of the receiving signal.
• Instantaneous rate maximization approach: The network
broadcasts M, the exact numbers of connected users
with different radio conditions. Based on this information
and on the measured signal strength, the wireless users
estimate the throughput they will obtain in both systems.
A new user with radio condition n will then connect to
the system s∗ offering him the best throughput:
s∗ = argmax
s
Dsn
1 +
∑N
m=1
∑S
r=1M
r
m
Note that this scheme is not realistic as the network
operator will not divulge the exact number of connected
users in each system and each position of the cell.
We plot in Figure 3 the global utility for the three cases.
This global utility is the one defined in equation (13) and
expressed in Mbits, as users are interested in maximizing the
information they send during their transfer time.
As intuition would expect, the results show that the peak rate
maximization approach has the worst performance as a system
that offers the largest peak throughput may be highly-loaded,
resulting in a bad QoS. However, a surprising result is that
the hybrid scheme, based on partial information, is comparable
and even outperforms the full information scheme when traffic
increases. This is due to the fact that streaming users will
have relatively long sessions, visiting thus a large number of
network states; knowing the instantaneous throughput at arrival
will not bring complete information about the QoS during the
whole connection. On the contrary, the proposed hybrid, game
theoretic, approach aims at maximizing the QoS during the
connection time.
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Fig. 3. Global utility.
B. Control
We now turn to the second stage of our problem, where the
network tries to control the users’ behavior by broadcasting
appropriate information, expected to maximize its utility while
individual users maximize their own utility. We plot in Figure
4 the blocking rate for different ways of aggregating load infor-
mation, obtained when users follow the policy corresponding
to Nash equilibrium. In this figure, we plot the results for
three cases: the optimal thresholds (in red stars) and two
other sets of thresholds. We can observe that the utility of the
network (expressed in the acceptance rate) varies significantly
depending on the load information that is broadcast. Such
an accurate modeling of the control problem is a key to
understand the actual benefits brought by the proposed hybrid
decision approach.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied hybrid association schemes in
heterogeneous networks. By hybrid schemes we mean dis-
tributed decision schemes assisted by the network, where the
wireless users aim at maximizing their own utility, guided by
information broadcast by the network about the load of each
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Fig. 4. Blocking rate for different broadcast load information; a vector of
thresholds [H1,H2, L1, L2] means that system s will be considered as highly
loaded if its load exceeds s2 and as low-loaded if its load is below s1 (s = H
for HSDPA and L for LTE).
system. We first show how to derive the utilities of flows
that are related to the QoS they receive under the different
association policies. We then derive the policy that corresponds
to the Nash equilibrium. Finally, we show how the operator, by
sending appropriate information about the state of the network,
can optimize its own utility. The proposed hybrid decision
approach for the association problem can reach a good trade-
off between the global network performance at the equilibrium
and the requested amount of signaling.
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